A brief summary of excise and sales taxation in India by Due, John Fitzgerald

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS L.tiRARY
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIQN
BOOKSTACKS
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/briefsummaryofex1213duej

EBR
FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 1213
A Brief Summary of Excise and
Sales Taxation in India
John F. Due
College of Commerce and Business Administration
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO 1213
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Ur bana -Champa i gn
December 1985
A Brief Summary ot Excise and Sdies
Tan a t i on in I nd i a
John F. Due, Professor
Department of Economics

Abstract
The Central government of India and the states make substantial
use of indirect taxes, which yield about 80 percent of total tax reve-
nue. The Central government uses an extensive system of excises,
which is so broad in coverage as to constitute in essence a manufac-
turers sales tax, with widely varying rates. The states and the union
territories apply sales taxes, which now constitute their chief source
of revenue. The sales taxes are now imposed primarily at the first
point, that is, sale by the manufacturer or first seller in the state,
though there is limited collection at the retail level and some multi
point (turnover tax) elements. Various efforts have been made to meet
the interstate problem, but have culminated in multiple taxation of
many interstate transactions by the exporting state and the importing
state, as permitted by Central government law. The state levies are
characterized by complex, multiple rates (as many as 19) and many spe-
cial features for various types of business, and involve substantial
taxation of inputs, as do the Central excises. There is believed to
be widespread evasion of tax; this has resorted to use of check points
on the roads, which delay traffic. The complex Central and state pic-
ture is aggravated by the use of the octroi by many cities— a tax on
goods entering the city.
There has been extensive analysis of the taxes and the defects,
and many suggestions for reform, but the problems of the complexity,
extensive taxation of inputs, evasion, and overtaxation of interstate
transactions continue. The experience offers little for optimization
of commodity taxation in other Federal countries, except in calling
attention to features that should be avoided.
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The tax structure of India is of interest to Canada and other
Federal countries because of the long experience with indirect taxa-
tion at both the Central and State levels. There is substantial
literature in India on the indirect taxes, and the subject is the
focus of much of the work of the prestigious National Institute of
Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) in New Delhi. The Report of the
Indirect Taxation Enquiry Committee (the Jha Committee) is one of the
most exhaustive studies of indirect taxation ever made in any country.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief framework of the
structure and operation of the taxes in India and the significance of
*The author is greatly indebted to the staff of the National
Institute of Public Finance and Policy, particularly the director,
Dr. A. Bagchi , and Dr. M. A. Purohit for their assistance, and to
officials of various Central and State revenue departments.
Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue,
New Delhi, 1978.
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the experience for other Federal countries, and call attention to the
2
work, on the subject in India.
The Constitutional Division of Powers
The Indian constitution allocates taxing powers more precisely
than those of most Federal countries; only a brief outline will be
provided here:
Central government : The central government is allocated personal
and corporate income taxes except on income from agricultural land;
taxes on wealth, except agricultural land; customs and excises,
except excises on liquor and narcotics, medicinal and toilet prepara-
tions that include alcohol; and miscellaneous items. The central
2
Major recent sources include R. J. Chelliah, Reform of the Sales
Tax (New Delhi: National Institute of Public Finance and Policy
(NIPFP), 1981); A. Bagchi , Sales Taxation in West Bengal - Interim
Report (New Delhi: NIPFP, 1983); NIPFP, Rationalization of the Sales
Tax in Bihar
,
(New Delhi, 1979); M. Govinda Rao and V. B. Tylasidhar,
"An Economic Analysis of Sales Tax in India," unpublished paper,
NIPFP, 1985; M. G. Rao and G. Pradhan, "Excise Duty Evasion in Cotton
Textile Fabrics," unpublished paper, NIPFP, 1984; M. C. Purohit,
"Structure of Sales Taxes in India," Economic and Political Weekly
,
August 21, 1982, pp. 1365-1375; M. C. Purohit, "Buoyancy and Income
Elasticity of State Taxes in India," Artha Vijnana, Vol. 20 (Sept.
1978), pp. 244-87; G. Thimaiah, "Sales Tax Controversy in India,"
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation
,
Vol. 27 (March 1983),
pp. 125-28.
Earlier studies include James Cutt, Taxation and Economic Develop-
ment in India (New York Praeger, 1969); W. R. Mahler, Sales Taxation
in India (Bombay: Orient Longmans 1970).
There have been several Ph.D. dissertations of widely varying
quality on the sales taxes of particular Indian states. Note, for
example, M. C. Purohit, Sales Tax in India (S. Chand , New Delhi 1975),
stressing Rajasthan, A. K. Agarwal , Commodity Taxes in India (Chugh
Publications, Allahabad, 1981) stressing Uttar Pradesh; and J. K.
Godha, The Working and Administration of Sales Tax in Bombay/Maharashtra
,
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Poona, 1969.
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government is also given power over taxes on interstate sales, and has
residual powers not otherwise assigned.
States : The states (22) and union territories (9) are allocated
sales taxes, subject to Federal control over taxes on interstate
sales, taxes on liquor and drugs; taxes on agricultural land and the
income therefrom; and a number of miscellaneous levies.
Relative Revenue Sources
Of the central government tax revenue, about 73 percent is pro-
vided by indirect taxes, 21 percent by income taxes, and 6 percent
miscellaneous. Of the indirect taxes, the excises yield 46 percent of
total tax revenue, customs 27 percent. The relative importance of
customs revenue has fallen in half over the last 30 years. At the
state level, the sales tax is the dominant revenue source, yielding in
1982-83 58 percent of total tax revenue, including in the total the
amount provided by the central government. In eight states the figure
is over 60 percent of the total. Thus both Federal and state govern-
ments depend very heavily upon commodity taxes, which yield nearly 80
percent of the total tax revenue. This is a high figure even by
comparison with many other developing countries. The share of customs
duties is much less than common in LDCs , a product of the large size
of the country, its highly protective tariffs, and the early develop-
ment of domestic manufacturing and domestic indirect taxes.
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CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES
Customs Duties
India has followed a policy of the use of very high protective
duties, averaging now about 100 percent of the price exclusive of
customs duty. Most are ad valorem. In addition there are counter-
vailing duties equivalent to the domestic excises, which change
simultaneously with the latter. The government has been moving in the
last year from import quotas to open general licensing, thus
increasing the relative importance of protective duties, and there is
some pressure to move away from licensing entirely. There are common-
wealth and regional preference rates. The tariff employs CCC nomen-
clature, with current move to the new consolidated nomenclature, which
will also apply to excises.
Smuggling is a problem, primarily of gold from the Arabian penin-
sula, synthetic textiles, watches and electronic products.
Excises
India has one of the most complete excise tax systems in the
world. There are 127 excise categories, many with subdivisions, and a
"catch all" category covering those goods not specified by name.
Since 1977 virtually all manufactured goods are subject to tax, with
widely varying rates. Cigarettes, sugar, kerosene, motor fuel, tex-
tiles, and iron and steel products are the major categories on the
basis of revenue yield. High rates are applied to luxury goods to
check consumption. There are a number of concessional rates to aid
small businesses.
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The excises apply to both inputs and finished products. Set-off
of the tax on inputs against the tax due on the final products is
allowed only when the commodities fall within the same tariff heading.
Each excise is technically a separate levy on a particular com-
modity; firms must keep separate records and file separate returns for
each tariff-heading commodity produced—though many firms produce only
one taxable commodity. The levies are technically excises, applying to
production, not to sale, and due when the goods leave the factory.
Firms pay on account on a continuing basis, and file a monthly
return. On tobacco and tire and tubes, excise personnel are stationed
in the factory at all times; on other commodities, control rests
heavily on checks at the state border check points noted below, random
checks, and audit. At the check points, if documents showing that
excise has been paid are not available, the commodities may be seized;
the license can be cancelled and the plant seized, but rarely is this
done. In fact, much of the collection is based on self assessment,
and some small firms are subject to "forfait" or agreed-upon payment
regardless of the exact amount of output in the period.
Administration of Customs and Excise
There is a single customs and excise service under the Central
Board of Excise and Customs, a unit of the Department of Revenue in
the Finance Ministry. Personnel are shifted between customs and
excise, but with substantial specialization at higher levels. The
total staff is about 56,000 (1985); there are four classes: A) policy
making (recruited in part at this level), B) supervisory, C) main
group, and D) miscellaneous. The first three groups are recruited
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entirely from university graduates. Ninety percent of all personnel
have university degrees. C and B classes are assigned to collectors
offices and function under the collector. The A group operates nation-
wide. The system is not yet computerized, but this is planned.
There are approximately 60,000 active excise duty accounts.
Artisan handicraft enterprise is exempt from licensing, as well as all
manufacturers with annual sales under 2 million rupees (about $US 160,000)
Firms are registered by "range" in each division; each collection
office typically has seven or eight divisions.
As noted, in part control is physical, in part by inspection and
audit. There are three categories of personnel: audit groups, which
examine records; an investigative branch, which pursues the most
troublesome cases; and inspectors, who make brief checks, reaching
most firms once a year, larger firms twice. The principal leakages
are reported to be undervaluation and unauthorized clearance, that is,
3
shipments of goods not reported. Little problem is reported with
firms failing to obtain licenses. Information is shared with the
states
.
3
An unpublished study of the National Institute of Public Finance
and Policy by M. G. Rao and G. Pradhan, "Excise Duty Evasion," supra,
footnote 2) examines the evasion arising out of the attempts of the
government to encourage small scale textile production by exempting the
types of cotton yarn used by hand looms and the application of dif-
ferent rates to various types of textiles. There is substantial
misclassif ication of textiles to obtain the lower rates, use of exempt
cotton for power looms, and reporting power loom production as hand
production. The conclusion is reached that through misclassif ication
of yarns and cloth produced in the composite mill sector, the revenue
loss is about 28 percent of what should be collected from the textile
sector, in addition to the loss from reporting of power looms as hand
looms
.
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Criticisms
While the operation of the excises is believed to be relatively
good, the structure has been subject to substantial criticism. The
most serious defect, from the standpoint of the economy, is the exten-
sive taxation of inputs; about half of the revenue comes from inputs
in production, the other half from final consumer goods. The objec-
tions to taxing inputs are well known: the presence of tax in export
prices, the distortion in selection of inputs and thus loss in effi-
ciency, the alteration of relative final goods prices since the
cumulated tax on inputs will differ, and pyramiding from application
of percentage markups. Some tendency is reported for firms to push
functions and thus cost elements beyond the point of impact of the
tax.
The principal objectionable feature from an operational standpoint
is the excessive number of separate excises, which complicates the
tasks of the firms and the administration. There are numerous rates,
and serious problems of delineation between commodities in various
rate groups. There is no simple list of rates; a substantial book is
required to provide information on the rates applying to various
goods. There is great variation in rates—with little obvious
rationale
.
Other criticisms advanced include the continued importance of spe-
cific rates, which yield about 65 percent of the revenue, though pri-
marily from commodities on which specific rates are used in most
countries, and the limited scope of the tax in the sense that only
manufactured goods are taxed.
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There have been a number of suggestions for change, including a
major proposal by the 1977-78 Taxation Enquiry Commission, which
suggested the merger of the various excises into a value added tax at
the manufacturing level, called MANVAT. Such a levy would greatly
simplify the tax and would permit elimination via the tax credit
device of the taxation of inputs. Concerns have been expressed about
the ability of firms to handle the value added feature. But certainly
this offers the most promising avenue of reform.
THE STATE SALES TAXES
The states have developed an extremely complex sales tax struc-
ture, without question the most complicated one in the world. The
interrelationship among the levies of the various states and between
the states and the central government is of particular interest to
other Federal countries.
Origin
The states began to impose selective sales taxes on cigarettes,
motor fuel and some other commodities as early as the mid 1930s. The
first general sales tax was imposed by Tamil Nadu (then Madras) in
1939. This was followed during World War II and the post war period by
the other states, until ultimately the coverage became general.
Structure
The states have used three forms of general sales tax, according
to the point of application. Most started out as purely one form or
the other, but today many of the states use elements of two or three
forms
.
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Multi-point or turnover tax: Four states rely significantly upon
the multi-point tax, which applies to each transaction through which
the commodity passes, levied at relatively low rates. These are
Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala, and Andhra Pradesh, all in the south.
But other states apply multi-point taxes to some commodities, and the
four relying substantially on this form apply single point taxes to
many commodities. The first point taxes yield over 60 percent of the
total sales tax revenue in all four.
Last-point (retail sales) taxes: Several of the taxes were ini-
tially imposed at the retail level, the last point of sale, and many
states still apply the tax on some commodities at this stage. But in
general the states have moved away from it to the first point because
of enforcement problems with retailers and the establishment of
"bogus" retailers—dummy firms executing declarations that they are
buying for resale, when in fact they do not function at all.
First Point - The trend has been toward first point taxes; that
is, taxes applying to the first sale in the state, by the manufacturer
on goods produced in the state and by the firm "importing" into the
state and making the first sale. This form lessens the problems of
controling retailers but is not without problems. Because of the
higher rates, licensed firms have greater incentive to evade tax.
There are problems of ensuring that the tax has been paid on the first
transaction; as a consequence most states have established check
points on roads coming into the state, and truckers must provide evi-
dence that tax has been paid on the merchandise carried. But there
are ways of avoiding the check posts, and there is widespread belief
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of corruption. Complete checking of all trucks is impossible. Rail
shipments are not checked in most instances.
On the whole, however, the states have come to prefer the first
point, confining the last point application to a few high margin com-
modities. For 15 states for which the data are available, on the
average 70 percent of the revenue is collected at the first point,
with figures over 90 percent in Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, and
Rajasthan (northern states that typically concentrate on the first
point), to 34 in Punjab (which concentrates on the last point) and 47
4
in West Bengal (Calcutta).
One state, Gujarat, continues to apply the tax at both the first
and last point (but not intermediate stages), a policy also long
followed in Maharashtra (Bombay), before the latter shifted to single
point in 1981.
Apart from the basic structure of the tax applying to licensed
dealers, several of the tax structures include purchase tax elements,
applying to purchases by licensed firms, primarily of unprocessed farm
products sold by a number of small producers.
To add to the complexity, a number of states add surtaxes to the
sales taxes, often earmarking the revenue for a particular purpose.
Others impose an additional sales tax at a low rate, and some impose
both a surtax and an additional tax. Both of these result in higher
overall sales taxes.
4
Purohit, "Structure of Sales Taxes," supra, footnote 1, p. 1366.
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The Rate Structures
No simple generalizations about the rate structures are possible,
except that they are very complex.
The number of rates is very large, averaging 15, ranging from 19
rates in Bihar and Gujarat to 6 in Orissa. The basic rate as of 1985
ranges from 5 in Kerala to 10 in Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Madhya
Pradesh; the median basic figure and the most typical one is 8 percent.
In some jurisdictions, most commodities are subject to the same rate;
this is particularly true in Haryana and the Punjab (both 10%).
Cereals and pulses (grains) and fertilizer are subject to lower than
typical rates (and exempt in five states). Goods regarded as luxury
items are tvpically subjected to higher rates than widely used goods,
Orissa using rates up to 16 percent on some goods. There are some
verv fine distinctions in some states; Andhra Pradesh has rates of 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, and 13 percent. In some states higher rates
are applied to large firms.
Exemptions are relatively limited, but vary among states. Five,
for example, exempt basic foodstuffs, while other taxes them at lower
rates. But overall there is very little exemption of necessities.
Taxation of Inputs (Producers Goods)
The taxes in general make no effort to exclude inputs into produc-
tion. There is no general exemption of raw materials, other ingre-
dients, basic inputs in agriculture, or capital equipment, and there
is, of course, some multiple application of tax to final products. In
several states, materials that become physical ingredients are
exempted, in some, regardless of where sale of the finished products
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occurs, in others only if the product is sold within the state. Other
states tax materials at a lower rate. No state seeks to exclude all
items directly used in production or all business inputs.
One estimate indicates that 34 percent of all sales tax revenue is
collected on inputs in the production process. In a sample of six
states, the range is from 39.3 percent in Madhya Pradesh to 22 percent
,
5
in Karnataka.
While no serious effort has been made to exclude inputs, the
states have provided a number of concessions to lure new industry, and
in the process have reduced input taxes, but in a random and haphazard
way, primarily excluding raw materials and capital equipment purchases
from tax, but also excluding the sales by eligible firms. These con-
cessions are granted for a limited period of years, and some are mere
deferments of tax.
Interstate Transactions
Under the constitution, the central government was given power
over interstate sales. By legislation first enacted in 1957, inter-
state sales of "declared" goods, which include most commodities, are
subject to the Central Sales Tax, originally at a 1 percent rate, in
recent years at a 4 percent rate on sales to registered dealers, 10
percent on sales to unregistered buyers. This tax is collected
by the states, but separate registration is required. The revenue
accrues to the state of origin of the sale. Then, of course, sub-
sequent sale in the state into which goods come is subject to the
Rao and Talhasidar, "Sales Taxation," supra footnote 2, Table 5.
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sales tax of that state. Substantial reliance is placed on the check
point system to ensure that tax on the interstate sales is paid.
Since 1957, sales taxes on mill-made textiles, tobacco, and sugar
have been replaced by increased Central excises, which are collected
bv the Central government and the revenue allocated to the states.
Goods sold for export outside India are exempt from tax, but there
is no drawback of taxes paid on inputs or previous sales. Imports
from outside India are not subject to tax until they are sold bv a
licensed firm in the state. Thus imports by manufacturers or others
for use and not resold are never subject to sales tax.
The Octroi
Distinct from the Central excises and the state sales taxes are
the octroi levies, imposed bv the cities on goods coming into the
cities from the outside, enforced primarily by check points at which
trucks are stopped before entering the city. Many of these are levied
on a specific rate basis, without regard to the value of the goods.
These resemble the local import duties imposed by the cities of medieval
Europe.
Operation of the Taxes
Only a brief summary of the operation of the taxes is feasible in
this paper. The taxes are administered under the jurisdiction of the
sales tax (or commercial tax) Commissioner of the state. In addition
to office personnel, a staff of commercial field officers maintains
contact with the registered firms and one of assessing officers makes
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assessments , and in most states an investigation unit tracks down
evasion.
Registration . All firms are required to register for the tax,
provided their sales volume exceeds a specified figure. The exemption
figures vary somewhat with the type of business and have been changed
from time to time; it is difficult to give a simple summary. For
example, in West Bengal, the 1985 exemption figures are R20,000 for
an importer, R50,000 for a manufacturer, R100,000 for a manufacturer
of cooked food and other dealers. These are roughly, in US$1,600,
$4,000, and $8,000 respectively, very low figures by usual standards.
The figure is R50,000 in Maharastra. In Tamil Nadu the figure is
R50,000, but there is no exemption for first point dealers. In Assam
the figure is only R20,000 for dealers, with no exemption for manufac-
turers and importers. In general, these figures are relatively low,
thus making large numbers of relatively small firms subject to
registration. In fact, however, it would appear that many are not
registered. In West Bengal, for example, there were 59,714 firms
registered in 1977, whereas according to the commercial census there
were 217,895 establishments.
In the states as a whole, there are about 2.5 million registered
firms. No exact figures are available, as many states report the
registrants for the state sales tax and the Central sales tax sepa-
rately, and the combined figure exceeds the actual number of regis-
trants, as many are registered for both taxes. Maharashtra (Bombay)
Bauchi, West Bengal, supra, footnote 1, pp. 27-28.
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with 379,000, has the largest followed by Tamil Nadu (Madras), Uttar
Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh, all of which have in excess 300,000
registered firms. By contrast Nagaland and Pondicherry have only
3,000 and 4,000 respectively (both are Union territories).
While most states are making some use of computers for tax pur-
poses, the use is often limited, in some instances to data of goods
entering the state. Karnataka (Bangalore) is one of the few to have
the master file of tax registered firms on the computer.
Returns. The most common pattern is to require returns on a
monthly basis, plus an annual return. But some are moving to longer
intervals, Maharashtra, for example, to quarterly payments with
monthly payments by the larger firms.
Some states prefer payment in cash rather than check, and require
the firms to bring this in person to the local office.
Assessment . All returns are assessed, in the tradition of income
taxes. This involves a brief check by assessing officers, not de-
tailed audit. But most states have had serious difficulty in keeping
assessment on schedule, with long time lags, to the detriment of
effective administration. Assessment in this sense differs from North
American practice in which the returns are merely checked for arith-
metic and completeness before the data are entered into the computer
or other system.
Information provided by Dr. M. Purohit, N1PFP.
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Serious audit is confined to a relatively few firms, mainly aimed
at finding outright evasion. Maharashtra, with over 300,000 accounts,
found onlv 54 cases of evasion in 1982-83.
Revenue From Large Firms . As is typical in other countries, a
very large portion of the revenue comes from the larger firms. Eighty
percent of the revenue is obtained from 12 percent of the firms in
Gujarat, 6.5 percent in Madhya Pradesh, 6 percent in Karnataka, 10
Q
percent in Uttar Pradesh.
Costs of Collection . The unweighted average of cost of collection
9
as a percentage of revenue in 19 states was 1.64 percent in 1980/81.
Of the larger states, Maharashtra has a figure of 1.01, West Bengal,
.88, for example. For the 19 states, the high is 3.12 in Assam, the
low .13 in Himachal Pradesh. A very low figure often indicates in-
adequate control. Figures between 1 and 2 percent are common in other
countries.
Overall Effectiveness . Overall effectiveness of administration is
difficult to assess. But detailed studies by the NIPFP in West
Bengal and the paper by R. J. Chelliah, one of the country's most
distinguished public finance experts, suggest that administration is
o
Rao and Tylasidhar, "Sales Taxation," supra, footnote 2, p. 7.
9
Bauchi, West Bengal
,
supra, footnote 1, p. 42.
10
Bauchi, ibid., pp. 25-39.
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not highlv effective. Information systems are particularly inade-
quate. Trained personnel are difficult to obtain and retain.
Distribution of Burden
Despite the substantial taxation of basic food, medicines, and
clothing, studies made by the 1977-78 Indirect Taxation Enquiry Com-
mittee conclude that the tax burden is distributed in a highly
progressive fashion as a percentage of total expenditure, ranging from
.65 percent in the lowest income bracket to 3.99 with those in the
12
highest bracket. The distribution in relation to income is without
doubt less progressive. A more recent (1982) study by Ahmed and Stern
13
concludes that the distribution is more or less proportional.
Elasticity and Buoyancy
The sales taxes have demonstrated a high degree of both elasticity
and buoyancy. The buoyancy in the period 1970-71 to 1981-82 was 1.9,
that is, as GNP rose, the sales tax revenue rose by almost a 50 per-
cent higher percentage. This figure was far higher than that of
14
the income tax (.98). Twelve of the large states showed figures
in excess of 1.5, and Karnataka showed a figure of 1.82. Most of the
Chelliah, Sales Tax Reform
,
supra, footnote 2, pp. 8-12.
12
Report of Indirect Taxation Enquiry Committee
,
supra, footnote 1.
13
Rao and Tylasidhar, Sales Taxation
,
supra, footnote 2, p. 10;
E. Ahmed and N. Stern, "Indirect Taxes and Prices in India," Discus-
sion Paper y'14, Development Economics Research Centre, University of
Warwick, 1982.
1A
Ibid.
,
p. 2 and Table 2.
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buoyancy was a product of high elasticity, which averaged 1.31 for the
16 larger states, with highest of 1.6 in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil
Nadu. Only Assam showed elasticity and buoyancy figures less than 1.
The Defects of the System
There has been extensive discussion in India of the defects in the
sales tax system, but as is common, it is far easier to point out
defects than to devise acceptable avenues of reform. Some of the
issues relate to defects in the structure, others to interstate
aspects.
Cascading and Taxation of Inputs . The sales taxes, like the
Central excises, involve substantial taxation of inputs. While, as
noted, some concessions are made to lessen the impact, there is no
overall serious attempt to exclude inputs. There is, in addition,
some multiple taxation of products as some turnover tax elements
remain, although for the most part the taxes are now collected at one
point. As noted below, additional cascading results from the treat-
ment of interstate sales. The concentration of collection at the
first point results in pyramiding of tax through application of per-
centage markups and in the shifting of activities and costs forward of
the point of the impact of the tax.
The consequences are well known. Input choices are distorted, as
are relative prices on final products. Vertical integration is
encouraged, as firms are given incentive to produce their own inputs.
The export prices contain tax elements, and prices to consumers rise
by more than the amount of the tax because of pyramiding.
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A related economic effect results from the failure to tax imports
into India unless they are sold after entering the country. Thus
large firms in a position to import on their own are favored over
smaller firms.
Interstate Problems . Under Central government legislation, firms
are permitted to apply tax, at a 4 percent figure, on sales to
registered huyers in other states. When the goods are subsequently
sold in the state into which they move, the tax of that state applies.
Thus the interstate transactions are taxed more heavily than intra-
state transactions, so long as there is a subsequent sale in the
importing state. Thus, in effect, the operation of the domestic com-
mon market is disrupted. Firms also have discovered means of escaping
the tax on interstate sales by establishing distribution units in the
importing state; shipments to these, essentially on consignment, are
not subject to the tax. A recent constitutional change permits taxa-
tion of these transactions, but the tax has not yet been extended to
them.
In addition to multiple taxation and interference with free flow
of goods, the present system allows the manufacturing states to burden
consumers in the less wealthy states—which would not occur under
retail sales taxes without multiple application.
Quite apart from the discrimination against interstate sales is
the tendency of some states and union territories to lower their sales
tax rates deliberately to lure business activity and to provide spe-
cial sales tax concessions to new industry. Two areas currently cri-
ticized for such rates are Delhi and Goa.
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Operational Aspects ; The Check Point System . As the states moved
to the first point collection, most—but not all—established check,
points on the roads entering the state, at which trucks are required
to stop and provide evidence that tax has been paid on commodities
carried. These are in addition to the check points established around
cities to enforce the octroi. This is a source of substantial
nuisance and delay, and cost to the truck operators, and a source of
deliberate harrassraent and reported corruption. The Indian states
have in effect established fiscal frontiers—though rather leaky
ones—as the EEC countries move away from them. There are ways and
means of escape, by using back roads, and air and rail shipments are
not subject to control.
The Complexity . There is no other sales tax structure in the
world that is as complicated as that of Indian states—and countries
that have relatively complex systems, such as New Zealand, are moving
toward simplification. The prime source of the problem is the
multiplicity of rates. Sales taxes of all types clearly work most
effectively with a single uniform rate. Two or three may be
tolerable. But the use of large numbers—as many as 19—makes
compliance and administration tremendously complicated and impairs the
operation of the taxes. There can be no possible rationale of using,
for example, rates of 6, 7, 8 and 9 percent on various commodities.
The complexity is aggravated by the use of the surcharges and
additional sales taxes most states use—instead of adjusting the level
of rates—and higher rates on larger firms. Procedures also vary
widely among states.
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General Administration . Apart from the check point problem, there
are numerous criticisms of the administration of the taxes. Firms
must register separately for the Central sales tax and the state
taxes, although the states administer both, and in some state sepa-
rately for various state Acts. The task, of operation is tremendously
complicated by the multiple rates. Some of the forms are complex and
copies sometimes not available. The exemption figures for small firms
have not been updated for inflation, and it is widely argued that too
many small firms are required to register.
As noted above, there is widespread belief that the taxes are not
administered well by the states, in part because of inadequate person-
nel and salaries. While some steps have been taken toward com-
puterization, limited use is made in most states— though the sales tax
field is particularly suited for computer use. Stories of corruption
are widespread. One has the impression that the sales tax com-
missioners are highly competent but lack the staffs to do an adequate
job.
In summary, it should be noted that some of the criticisms of the
system arise from features of the taxes that are inevitable so long as
the states have autonomy in the sales tax field— the rate differen-
tials, for example, that may distort location of business activity.
The pyramiding is inevitable so long as the taxes cannot be admin-
istered at the retail level. Interstate sales inevitably create
complications under the circumstances. The most serious criticisms
relate to the cascading and excessive taxation of inputs, the
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d is crimination against interstate transactions made possible by the
Central Sales Tax legislation, and the complexity.
Despite these defects, it must be recognized that the taxes are
highly productive of revenue. The states, of course, did not set out
to make the structures complicated; it is often argued that the spe-
cial features are all products of attempts to meet various dif-
ficulties that have arisen. But one cannot help concluding that
extensive restructuring is needed to make the system much more effi-
cient and the source of much less excess economic burden.
Possible Avenues of Reform
Possible general reform of the state sales taxes is much more dif-
ficult than reform of the Central excises, and no obvious solutions
appear. It is generally agreed that if the states could administer
retail sales taxes, this would be the optimal solution. A single
rate, or use of no more than two or three rates, would greatly
simplify operation. On interstate transactions, with retail taxes, the
state of consumption would receive the revenue. There would remain the
problem of interstate sales to final consumers; the consuming states
could reach these to some extent by the equivalent of the use taxes of
the American states, and the leakage would not be too great. But it is
rather clear that given the nature of retail activity in India today, a
retail (final point) tax is not feasible; it can be regarded as an
ultimate goal.
A substantially different alternative would eliminate the state
sales taxes completely, merging them into the Central general excise
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system, hopefully readjusted into the value added form. The revenue
would be distributed to the states on the basis of a formula. But
this approach, strongly supported by some business groups, while
simplifying operation, would greatly reduce the fiscal autonomy of the
states, since the sales taxes are their principal revenue sources. It
is likely not politically feasible and is objectionable in principle,
given the acceptance of the desirability of a Federal state.
A third alternative, designed to retain autonomy but improve
operation, would be to develop a system comparable to that of Brazil.
The Central tax would be modified into a value added tax at the manu-
facturing level; the states would develop their own value added taxes
covering all firms in distribution with sales above a specified
volume. All sales would be taxable regardless of the purchaser
(except exports from the country); registered purchasers would in turn
receive credit for tax paid on purchases against tax due on their
sales. Each state would give credit for sales tax paid to another
state as well as that paid to itself. This system would eliminate the
present multiple taxation of interstate sales as well as cascading of
the tax and would eliminate—if operated effectively—the need for
check points. It would have one undesirable effect: the manufac-
turing states would gain more of the total tax revenue and the non-
manufacturing states less than under a last point system. This could
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be offset only by some form of Central government grant system. The
other objection raised relates to the ability of the firms to comply
with the tax. Firms would have to keep records of tax paid on pur-
chases as well as tax due on sales. Any system excluding small firms
favors such firms over larger ones—but of course only the margin of
the small firm escapes, not the entire amount of tax on the commodity.
There are other issues of reform distinct from these basic issues,
such as the desirability of taxing the purchases of basic food crops,
which many states do, though at lower rates. This can be questioned
on equity grounds, but some states defend this policy on the grounds
that they have no other effective revenue sources.
Implications for Canada and Other Countries
What implications does the Indian experience have for other
countries using sales taxes, and particularly other Federal countries?
First, the experience in a sense unfortunately confirms the experience
in some other countries that a complex indirect tax structure
with many potential objectionable consequences does function and it
does yield substantial revenue. The harm to the economy is difficult
to measure. Secondly, the system shows the hazards of ad hoc adjust-
ments to meet particular problems that arise; a multiplicity of such
adjustments results in a confusing and complex system. Thirdly, the
experience with interstate transactions indicates the danger of poten-
tial multiple taxation of interstate sales, with consequent inter-
ferences with free functioning of the domestic market. If the exporting
states were allowed to tax and the importing state was not, double
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taxation would be avoided and enforcement would be relatively easy
—
but the importing state has legitimate claim to all or most of the
revenue. Indian experience stresses the evils of allowing both the
states to tax.
The problem of different rates among states and among Canadian
provinces involves a basic quandry: differences lead to mislocation of
economic activity, but preventing differences would destroy the fiscal
autonomy of the states. Clearly if the central government alone were to
operate sales taxes, the interstate complexities, differentiation, and
multiple taxation would end—but again the autonomy of the states
would be lost. There is no ideal solution. But in India introduction
of value added elements in the taxes would solve one of the most
serious difficulties— the taxation of inputs. Many of the problems
could be solved if the states could use retail sales taxes, but it is
rather clear that in India they cannot.
Thus the experience is of somewhat limited significance for Canada
and other Federal states, except for stressing the difficulties of
attaining optimality in indirect taxation in a Federal system, espe-
cially when retail sales taxes or value added taxes through the retail
level do not appear to be possible elements in the solution. Perhaps
the greatest significance is in stressing what should not be done in
the field.
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